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Abstract. We prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium for exchange economies with
a measure space of agents and for which the commodity space is `p, 1 < p < +∞. A vector
x = (xn) in `p may be interpreted as a security which promises to deliver xn units of numeraire
at state (or date) n.
Under assumptions imposing uniform bounds on marginal rates of substitution, positive re-
sults on core-Walras equivalence were established in Rustichini–Yannelis [21] and Podczeck [20].
In this paper we prove that under similar assumptions on marginal rates of substitution, the set
of competitive equilibria (and thus the core) is non-empty.
1. Introduction
We consider an Arrow–Debreu exchange economy with inﬁnitely many agents and inﬁnitely
many commodities. Following the modelisation of perfect competition by Aumann [4] and Hilden-
brand [9], the set of agents is a ﬁnite positive measure space. The commodity space is the space
`p of sequences x = (xk) such that
P
k |xk|p < +∞ for 1 < p < +∞. Such spaces are relevant to
the allocation of resources over time or states of nature. In particular a bundle x in `p may be
interpreted as a security which promises to deliver xk units of num´ eraire at date (or state) k.
Under assumptions imposing uniform bounds on marginal rates of substitution, positive results
on core-Walras equivalence were established in Rustichini–Yannelis [21] and Podczeck [20]. In
this paper we prove that under similar assumptions on marginal rates of substitution, the set of
competitive equilibria (and thus the core) is non-empty. More precisely, we provide two frameworks
to prove the existence of competitive equilibria. In the ﬁrst one, existence is proved under an
assumption (borrowed from Zame [23] and Podczeck [20]) imposing the existence of a uniform
(over consumption) upper and lower bounds on marginal rates of substitution, at each state of
nature. In the second one, existence is proved for preference relations represented by separable
utility functions. But for this framework, we only require the existence of an upper bound on the
marginal rates of substitution at the initial endowment (and not uniformly over consumption) and
we require the existence of a uniform (over consumption) lower bound on the marginal rates of
substition at only one state of nature.
In the framework of economies with inﬁnitely many agents and inﬁnitely many commodities,
there are several existence results: Khan–Yannelis [11], Podczeck [18] and Martins-da-Rocha [14]
for separable Banach commodity spaces with an interior point in the positive cone; and Mas-
Colell [16], Jones [10], Ostroy–Zame [17], Podzeck [18, 19] and Martins-da-Rocha [15] for economies
with diﬀerentiated commodities. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to provide
an existence result for economies with an `p-commodity space.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we deﬁne the model of an economy with inﬁnitely
many agents and commodities and we set out the main deﬁnitions and notations. In Section 3
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we give the list of assumptions that economies will be required to satisfy and we present the two
existence results. The diﬀerent assumptions on the marginal rates of substitution are discussed in
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 is devoted to the proof of the two theorems.
2. The Model
2.1. Preliminaries. For each 1 < p < +∞, we denote by `p the real vector space of sequences
x = (xk)k in RN such that limn
Pn
k=0 |xk|p < ∞ and we denote by kxkp = (
P
k∈N |xk|p)1/p.
The space `p endowed with the norm k.kp is a separable Banach space whose dual is `q where
1 < q < +∞ is deﬁned by 1/p + 1/q = 1. We denote by `
p
+ the natural positive cone deﬁned
by x ∈ `
p
+ if and only if xk > 0 for each k ∈ N. A vector x in `
p
+ is called positive, and if for
each k, xk > 0, then x is called striclty positive. As usual, if x,y are two vectors of `p, x > y
means x − y ∈ `
p
+. The weak topology σ(`p,`q) is denoted by w, the weak-star topology σ(`q,`p)
is denoted by w∗ and the norm-topology deﬁned by k.kp is denoted by s.
Let τ be a topology on `p. If (Cn)n is a sequence of subsets of `p, the τ-sequential upper limit
of (Cn)n, is denoted τ-lsnCn and is deﬁned by
τ-lsnCn := {x ∈ `p : x = τ-lim
k
xk , xk ∈ Cn(k)}
where (Cn(k))k is a subsequence of (Cn)n.
The Borel σ-algebra of `p for the norm-topology or for the weak-topology coincide and is denoted
by B. A correspondence F from Ω to `p is said to be graph measurable if {(a,x) ∈ Ω × `p : x ∈
F(a)} belongs to A ⊗ B. A correspondence P from Ω to `p × `p is said to be graph measurable if
{(a,x,z) ∈ Ω × `p × `p : (x,z) ∈ P(a)} belongs to A ⊗ B ⊗ B.
A mapping s from Ω to `p is simple if there exist x1,x2,... ,xn in `p and A1,A2,... ,An in
A such that s =
Pn
i=1 xiχAi where χAi(a) = 1 if a ∈ Ai and χAi(a) = 0 if a 6∈ Ai. A mapping
x : Ω → `p is Bochner measurable if there is a sequence of simple mappings sn : Ω → `p such
that limn ksn(a) − x(a)kp = 0 almost every where. Since `p is norm-separable, we know from
Pettis’ measurability theorem (see [7, Theorem II.1.2, p.42]) that a mapping x : Ω → `p is Bochner
measurable if and only if for each B ∈ B, x−1(B) := {a ∈ Ω : x(a) ∈ B} belongs to A; and
moreover x is Bochner measurable if and only if for each k ∈ N, the function a 7→ xk(a) is
measurable.
A Bochner measurable mapping x from Ω to `p is Bochner integrable if there is a sequence of
simple mappings sn : Ω → `p such that limn
R
Ω ksn(a) − x(a)kp dµ(a) = 0. For each measurable
set A in A, we denote by
R
A xdµ the limit limn
R
A sndµ. It can easily be shown (see [7, p.45]) that
a Bochner measurable mapping x is Bochner integrable if and only if the mapping a 7→ kx(a)kp








A kx(a)kp dµ(a). Note that if x is a Bochner integrable
mapping from Ω to `p, then for each k ∈ N, the function a 7→ xk(a) is integrable and if we denote
by v :=
R
A xdµ then vk =
R
A xkdµ.
2.2. The Model. An economy E is a list
E = ((Ω,A,µ),`p,X,,e),
where X is a correspondence from Ω to `p,  is a correspondence from Ω to `p × `p and e is a
mapping from Ω to `p. The space of agents is (Ω,A,µ), a complete ﬁnite positive measure space.
The commodity space is `p with 1 < p < +∞. For each agent a ∈ Ω, the consumption set isEQUILIBRIA IN SECURITY MARKETS WITH A CONTINUUM OF AGENTS 3





a reﬂexive binary relation on `
p
+.




+ by Pa(x) = {x0 ∈ `
p
+ : x0 a x}. In particular, if
x ∈ `
p
+ is a consumption bundle, the set Pa(x) is the set of consumption bundles strictly preferred
to x by agent a. We let P be the correspondence from Ω to `p × `p deﬁned for each a ∈ Ω by
P(a) = {(x,x0) ∈ X(a) × X(a) : x0 a x}.
The set of allocations (or plans) of the economy is the set S1(X) of Bochner integrable selections
of X, i.e. S1(X) is the set of mappings x from Ω to `p which are Bochner integrable and which







We assume that the mapping e : Ω → `p is a Bochner integrable mapping and we denote by
ω :=
R
Ω edµ the aggregate initial endowment.
The price space is `q, and if x = (xk)k in `p is a bundle and p = (pk)k in `q is a price then the





Deﬁnition 2.1. A pair (x,p) consisting of a feasible allocation x and a non-zero price p is said to
be a competitive equilibrium if for almost every a ∈ Ω, hp,x(a)i = hp,e(a)i, and z ∈ Pa(x(a))
implies hp,zi > hp,x(a)i.
3. Existence of a competitive Equilibrium
We will maintain in this paper the following assumptions on the economy E.
Assumption 3.1. For each a ∈ Ω,
(i) the consumption set is X(a) = `
p
+;
(ii) the initial endowment is not zero, i.e. e(a) > 0;
(iii) a is reﬂexive, transitive and complete;
(iv) a is strictly monotone, i.e. for each x ∈ X(a), if z > x then z a x.
Assumption 3.2. For each a ∈ Ω, for every x ∈ X(a),
(i) the sets Pa(x) and P−1
a (x) = {z ∈ X(a): x a z} are s-open in X(a);
(ii) the set {z ∈ X(a): z a x} is convex.
Assumption 3.3. The correspondence P is graph measurable.
Assumption 3.4. For each a ∈ Ω, e(a) belongs to `1 and the function a 7→ ke(a)k1 is integrable.
Remark 3.1. Assumptions 3.1–3.3 are standard in the literature dealing with exchange economies
with ﬁnitely or inﬁnitely many agents. We will see that in our framework, we can not dispense
with Assumption 3.4.
1As usual, y a x means [y a x and x 6a y]. Note that the binary relation a coincide with the graph of the
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We provide hereafter two frameworks to prove the existence of competitive equilibria. In the ﬁrst
one, existence is proved under an assumption imposing upper and lower uniform (over agents and
consumptions) bounds on marginal rates of substitution. In the second one, existence is proved for
preference relations represented by separable utility functions but the assumption on the marginal
rates of substitution required for the existence is weaker. We only require a uniform (over agents
only) upper bound on the marginal rates of substition at the initial endowment and a uniform
(over agents and consumption) lower bound on the marginal rates of substition at one state of
nature.
3.1. The general case. In this section, we consider economies with general preference relations.
The following requirement is borrowed from Zame [23]. It is discussed in Section 4.
Deﬁnition 3.2. The preference relations ()a are said to be strong-uniformly proper, if there
exist strictly positive prices α and β in `
q
+ with α 6 β and such that for every a ∈ Ω, whenever
x,u,v ∈ `
p
+ satisfy v 6 x and hα,ui > hβ,vi then x − v + u a x.
An economy E is said strong-uniformly proper if it has strong-uniformly proper preference
relations.
We can now state our ﬁrst result for economies with general preference relations.
Theorem 3.3. If the economy E is strong-uniformly proper then there exists a competitive equi-
librium.
Remark 3.4. The strong-uniform properness assumption was already used in Zame [23]. Podczeck
in [20] prove the equivalence between the core and the set of competitive equilibria under this
assumption. Note that Rustichini–Yannelis [21] also proved the equivalence between the core and
the set of competitive equilibria under another properness assumption. Assumption 3.4 is un-
usual. Following Zame [23] we provide hereafter an example of a strong-uniformly proper economy
satisfying Assumptions 3.1–3.3 and not satisfying Assumption 3.4. For this economy the set of
competitive equilibria is empty.
Counterexample 3.5. Consider the economy E where Ω = [0,1], A is the Lebesgue σ-algebra and
µ is the Lebesgue measure. For each trader a ∈ [0,1], the consumption set coincide with `
p
+, the





and the initial endowment is deﬁned by
e(a) = (1,1/2,1/3,... ,1/n,...).
The economy E is strong-uniformly proper, it satisﬁes Assumptions 3.1–3.3 but not Assumption
3.4. It is proved in Zame [23] that E has no competitive equilibrium.
3.2. The separable case. In this section, we consider economies for which preference relations
are represented by separable utility functions.
Deﬁnition 3.6. A utility function u : `
p
+ → R is called separable if there exists for each n, a
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The function v = (vn) is called the kernel of u. The left derivative of vn in t > 0 is noted v−
n (t)
and the right derivative is denoted v+
n (t). If x ∈ `
p




+ we deﬁne S(x) = {h ∈ `p: ∃t > 0, x + th > 0} and I(x) = S(x) ∩ −S(x). We deﬁne
u0(x) · h = limr→0(1/r)[u(x + rh) − u(x)] for each x ∈ `
p
+ and each h ∈ S(x). Note that if h > 0




For economies with separable utility functions, a weaker condition than the uniform properness
will be suﬃcient to prove the existence of competitive equilibria.
Deﬁnition 3.7. An economy E is said separably proper if for each agent a ∈ Ω, the preference
relation a is represented2 by a separable utility function ua which kernel is denoted va and there
exists a measurable set Ω0 ∈ A of full measure,3 satisfying the following conditions.
(a) There exists β ∈ `q such that for each a ∈ Ω0,
v−
a (e(a)) 6 β.
(b) There exists k ∈ N and αk > 0 such that ωkαk > 0 and for each a ∈ Ω0,
0 < αk 6 inf{v
+




We can now state our second existence result for economies with preference relations represented
by utility functions.
Theorem 3.8. If the economy E is separably proper then there exists a competitive equilibrium.
The two proper conditions are not comparable. Obviously, not all strong-uniformly proper
economies are separably proper. Moreover, we provide hereafter an example of an economy which
is separably proper but not strong-uniformly proper.
Example 3.9. Consider the economy E where Ω = [0,1], A is the Lebesgue σ-algebra and µ is the
Lebesgue measure. For each trader a ∈ [0,1], the consumption set coincide with `
p
+, the utility
function ua is deﬁned by





and the initial endowment is deﬁned by
e(a) = (1,1/2,1/3,... ,1/n,...).
Following Example 4.5 the economy E satisﬁes Assumptions 3.1–3.4. Moreover this economy is
separably proper but not strong-uniformly proper.
4. Proper economies
We discuss in this section the notions of properness used in Theorem 3.3 and 3.8.
2That is x0 a x if and only if ua(x0) > ua(x).
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4.1. Strong-uniformly proper economies. We recall that the preference relations ()a are
said to be strong-uniformly proper, if there exist strictly positive prices α and β in `
q
+ with α 6 β
and such that for every a ∈ Ω, whenever x,u,v ∈ `
p
+ satisfy v 6 x and hα,ui > hβ,vi then
x − v + u a x.
This properness condition is borrowed from Zame [23]. Note that this is a requirement on
preferences that is uniform over agents as well as over consumption. We refer to Zame [23] for
a discussion of this condition as well as for corresponding examples. Following Podczeck [20], it
may be seen that if for each a ∈ Ω, {y ∈ X(a): y a x} is convex then uniform properness is
equivalent to the following statement: There are strictly positive prices α,β ∈ `
q
+, such that given
any a ∈ Ω and x ∈ X(a) there is a price p in the order interval [α,β] such that hp,xi 6 hp,yi for
all y ∈ X(a) with y a x. Since supporting prices are measures of marginal rates of substitution,
the strong-uniform properness assumption is a condition that puts strong bounds on these rates.
We recall the notion of uniform properness introduced by Yannelis–Zame [22] for economies
with ﬁnitely many agents.
Deﬁnition 4.1. The preference relations ()a are said to be v-uniformly proper with v ∈ `p,
if there exists a s-open 0-neighborhood V ⊂ `p such that for each a ∈ Ω, for each x ∈ `
p
+,
(x + Γ) ∩ `
p
+ ⊂ Pa(x) where Γ = ∪t>0t(v + V ).
Remark 4.2. The strong-uniform properness assumption on the preference relations implies that
∀a ∈ Ω, ∀x ∈ `
p
+, (x + Γ) ∩ `
p
+ ⊂ Pa(x),
where Γ is the convex and s-open cone deﬁned by Γ = {x ∈ `p: α(x+) > β(x−)}. It follows that the
strong-uniform properness assumption is a particular case of the uniform properness assumption.
Example 4.3. Consider the case of positive separable utility functions ua : `
p
+ → R, deﬁned by the
formula ua(x) =
P
n va,n(xn) where for each n, the function va,n : [0,+∞) → R is continuous,
the derivative v0
a,n(t) exists for each t > 0. Suppose that there exist α and β two strictly positive
functionals in `q such that
∀a ∈ Ω, ∀t > 0, αn 6 v0
n(t) 6 βn.
Then the preference relations deﬁned by the utility functions (ua)a∈Ω are strong-uniformly proper.
Indeed, let x,y,z ∈ `
p
+ satisfying y 6 x and α(z) > β(y). Using the mean value theorem, we see
that for each n there exists tn > 0 such that
va,n(xn − yn + zn) − vn(x) = v0
a,n(tn)[zn − yn].
But v0
a,n(tn)[zn − yn] > αnzn − βnyn, in particular
u(x − y + z) − v(x) > α(z) − β(y) > 0.
We refer to Araujo–Monteiro [2], Le Van [12] and Aliprantis [1] for precisions about proper
conditions for separable utility functions.
4.2. Separably proper economies. Following Aliprantis [1], we introduce the following notion
of separable utility function.
Deﬁnition 4.4. A separable utility function u : `
p
+ → R, where u(x) =
P
n vn(xn), is said to be
rational if for each n ∈ N,
(a) vn(0) = 0;
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(c) vn is diﬀerentiable on (0,+∞) with v0
n(t) > 0 for each t > 0.
Now let u be a rational separable utility function. The components of the lower and upper
gradient sequences v0 = (v0
1,v0
2,...) and v0 = (v0
1,v0










Following Aliprantis [1, Theorem 6.7], we have the following result.
Proposition 4.1. Let u : `
p
+ → R be rational utility function given by u(x) =
P
n vn(xn). If the
preference relations represented by u are ω-uniformly proper for some ω ∈ `p strictly positive, then
(a) the lower gradient v0 is non-zero and belongs to `
q
+; and






It follows that if E is an economy with rational separable utility function such that E is ω-
uniformly proper and ω is striclty positive, then E is separably proper. We provide hereafter
an example of a rational separable utility function which is separably proper but which is not
uniformly proper.
Example 4.5. Consider the rational separable utility function u : `
p
+ → R deﬁned by
v0(t) = t and ∀n > 1, vn(t) =
1 − exp(−tn2)
n2 .
For each n > 1, v0
n(t) = exp(−n2t). It follows that
v0 = (1,0,0,...) and v0 = (1,1,1,...).
It follows that u is not uniformly proper. However if e = (en)n is deﬁned by e0 = 1 and for each
n > 1 by en = 1/n then
v0(e) = (e−n)n ∈ `
p
+.
Hence u is separably proper.
5. Proof of Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.8
The space `q is norm-separable. Let (pi)i∈N be a norm-dense sequence in the closed unit ball of






The topology deﬁned by this distance coincide with the w∗-topology on norm-bounded subsets of
`p. Moreover, the d-topology is separable and the Borel σ-algebra generated by d coincide with
the Borel σ-algebra B generated by the norm-topology and the w∗-topology.
Let E be an economy satisfying Assumptions 3.1–3.4. Suppose that E is either strong-uniformly
proper or separably proper. The correspondence X is graph measurable. Applying Theorem B.1,
there exists a sequence (fk)k of measurable selections of X such that for each a ∈ Ω, X(a) =
s-cl{fk(a): k ∈ N}. For every k ∈ N, we let Rk be the correspondence from Ω into `p, deﬁned
by Rk(a) = {x ∈ `
p
+ : x a fk(a)}. For each ν ∈ N, we let Xν : a 7→ Xν(a) := X(a) ∩ νB and
Rk,ν : a  Rk,ν(a) := Rk(a) ∩ νB, where B is the closed unit ball in `p.8 A. ARAUJO, V. F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND P. K. MONTEIRO
Claim 5.1. There exists4 a sequence (σn)n of measurable partitions σn = (An
i )i∈Sn of (Ω,A), and
a sequence (An)n of ﬁnite sets An = {an
i : i ∈ Sn} subordinated to the measurable partition σn,




ken(a) − e(a)kp = 0 and ∀k ∈ N, lim
n
kfn
k (a) − fk(a)kp = 0;





(iii) if we pose g(a) := ke(a)k1 then g is an integrable function satisfying
∀n ∈ N, ken(a)k1 6 1 + g(a).
In particular, if we pose for each n ∈ N, ωn :=
R
Ω en then limn kωn − ωkp = 0.
Proof. If f is a function from Ω to `p, then we let {f(.)} be the correspondence from Ω into `p
deﬁned for each a ∈ Ω, by {f(.)}(a) := {f(a)}. Note that if f is measurable then f is Bochner
integrable if and only if kf(.)k : a 7→ kf(a)k from Ω to R+ is integrable.
Let Z := `p × `p and consider the following distance δ on Z deﬁned for each x = (x1,x2) and
y = (y1,y2) in Z by
δ(x,y) := kx1 − y1kp + d(x2,y2).
The metric space (Z,δ) is complete and separable. Let G := {ke(.)k1} and6
F := {{e(.)} × {0},{fk(.)} × {0},{0} × Rk : k ∈ N}.
Now apply Theorem B.6. 
We will now construct a sequence (En)n of economies with ﬁnitely many consumers converging








where In = {i ∈ Sn: µ(An
i ) 6= 0} is the ﬁnite set of consumers; σ is the counting measure on
In; for each agent i ∈ In, the consumption set is deﬁned by Xn
i := µ(An
i )X(an
i ) = `
p
+, the initial
endowment is deﬁned by en
i := µ(An
i )e(an
i ) and the preference relation is deﬁned by x0 n








i is deﬁned by Pn
i (x) = µ(An
i )Pan
i (x/µ(An
i )), for each x ∈ Xn
i .
Claim 5.2. There exists a feasible allocation (xn
i )i∈In for the ﬁnite economy En, a non-zero price
pn and a w∗-compact set K ⊂ `q such that
(1) for each i ∈ In, hpn,xn
i i = hpn,en
i i, and z ∈ Pn
i (xn
i ) implies hpn,zi > hpn,xn
i i; and
(2) pn ∈ K with hpn,ωi = 1.
4We refer to Appendix B for deﬁnitions and notations.
5Following notations of Section B.2, if f is function from Ω to `p, then for each n, {f(.)}n = {fn(.)}.
6If F and G are two correspondences from Ω to `p, then we let F × G be the correspondence from Ω to `p × `p,
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Proof. If the economy E is strong-uniformly proper then each economy En satisﬁes the assumptions
of Theorem A.1. In particular if we let K := {q ∈ `q: hq,ωi = 1 and hq,Γi > 0}, where
Γ = {x ∈ `p : hα,x+i > hβ,x−i}, then Claim 5.2 is proved.
If the economy E is separably proper then for each n large enough, αkωn
k > 0. Hence the economy
En satisﬁes the assumptions of Theorem A.3. In particular for each n, kpnkq 6 (1/αkωn
k)kβkq.
Since (ωn
k)n is norm-convergent to ωk if follows that the sequence (pn)n lies in a norm-bounded
set K ⊂ `q. In particular, Claim 5.2 is proved. 



















for a.e. a ∈ Ω, hpn,xn(a)i = hpn,en(a)i and z ∈ Pn
a (xn(a)) ⇒ hpn,zi > hpn,en(a)i (5.2)
pn ∈ K and hpn,ωi = 1. (5.3)
The set K is w∗-compact. Since `p is norm-separable, passing to a subsequence if necessary, we
can suppose that (pn)n converge to a non-zero price p ∈ `q which satisﬁes hp,ωi = 1.
For each z ∈ `
p
+, kzkp 6 kzk1; and for each y ∈ `
p

















kxn(a)kp dµ(a) < +∞.
Passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can suppose that w-limn
R
Ω xndµ exists in `p. Applying
Fatou’s Lemma (Theorem C.1) of Cornet–Martins-da-Rocha [6], there exists a Bochner integrable








x(a) ∈ co w-lsn{xn(a)} a.e. (5.5)







Proof. This is a direct consequence of Claim 5.1, (5.1) and (5.4). 
Claim 5.4. For almost every a ∈ Ω, x(a) ∈ `
p
+ and z ∈ Pa(x(a)) implies hp,zi > hp,e(a)i.10 A. ARAUJO, V. F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND P. K. MONTEIRO
Proof. Consider Ω0 =
S
n∈N Ω \ (∪i∈InAn
i ), then µ(Ω0) = 0. Let Ω0 be a measurable subset of
Ω \ Ω0 with µ(Ω \ Ω0) = 0 and such that all almost everywhere assumptions and properties are
satisﬁed for each a ∈ Ω0.
Since X(a) = `
p
+ is closed convex, we have that for each a ∈ Ω0, x(a) ∈ X(a). We will now prove
that for each a ∈ Ω0, if z ∈ Pa(x(a)) then hp,zi > hp,e(a)i. Let a ∈ Ω0 and let z ∈ Pa(x(a)). Since
`
p
+ = s-cl{fk(a) : k ∈ N}, we can suppose (extracting a subsequence if necessary) that (fk(a))k
is s-convergent to z. But Pa(x(a)) is s-open in `
p
+, thus there exists k0 ∈ N, such that for each
k > k0, fk(a) ∈ Pa(x(a)). To prove that hp,zi > hp,e(a)i, it is suﬃcient to prove that for each k
large enough, hp,fk(a)i > hp,e(a)i. Now, let k > k0.
Claim 5.5. There exists an increasing function ϕ : N → N such that
∀n ∈ N, f
ϕ(n)






Proof. Suppose that for each increasing function ϕ : N → N, there exists an increasing function
φ : N → N, such that:
∀n ∈ N, xϕ◦φ(n)(a) ∈ R
ϕ◦φ(n)
k (a).
Let ` ∈ w-ls{xn(a) : n ∈ N}, then there exists a subsequence (xϕ(n)(a))n w-converging to `.
In particular (xϕ◦φ(n)(a))n is w-convergent to `. It follows that there exists ν > 0 such that for
each n, xϕ◦φ(n)(a) belongs to νB. In particular, d(xϕ◦φ(n)(a),R
ϕ◦φ(n)
k,ν (a)) = 0. Applying Claim
5.1, it follows that d(`,Rk,ν(a)) = 0. Since Rk,ν(a) is w-closed and d coincide with w on νB, we
have that ` ∈ Rk(a). Thus w-ls{xn(a)} ⊂ Rk(a), and under Assumption 3.2, this implies that
co w-lsn{xn(a)} ⊂ Rk(a). It follows that x(a) ∈ Rk(a), i.e. fk(a) 6∈ Pa(x(a)): contradiction. 











. Passing to the limit,
we get that hp,fk(a)i > hp,e(a)i. 
Now let ¯ x be the Bochner integrable mapping from Ω to `p deﬁned by




Claim 5.6. The pair (¯ x,p) is an equilibrium of E.
Proof. Since
R
Ω(e − x)dµ > 0, Assumption 3.1 implies that ¯ x(a) ∈ `
p
+ and Pa(¯ x(a)) ⊂ Pa(x(a)).
In particular the allocation ¯ x is feasible and for each a ∈ Ω0, if z ∈ Pa(¯ x(a)) then hp,zi > hp,e(a)i.
Since a is monotone, it follows that ¯ x(a) belongs to the norm-closure of Pa(¯ x(a)), in particular
hp, ¯ x(a)i > hp,e(a)i. But
R
Ω ¯ xdµ =
R
Ω edµ, it follows that for almost every a ∈ Ω, hp, ¯ x(a)i =
hp,e(a)i. To prove that (¯ x,p) is an equilibrium, it is now suﬃcient to prove that for almost every
a ∈ Ω,
inf{hp,zi : z ∈ `
p
+} < hp,e(a)i.
Let B := {a ∈ Ω0: hp,e(a)i > 0}. The set B is measurable and since hp,ωi = 1, µ(B) 6= 0. Now
for each a ∈ B, inf{hp,zi : z ∈ `
p
+} < hp,e(a)i and z ∈ Pa(¯ x(a)) ⇒ hp,zi > hp, ¯ x(a)i. It follows
that
∀a ∈ B, z ∈ Pa(¯ x(a)) ⇒ hp,zi > hp, ¯ x(a)i.EQUILIBRIA IN SECURITY MARKETS WITH A CONTINUUM OF AGENTS 11
The preference relation a is monotone, i.e. for each z > 0, ¯ x(a) + z ∈ Pa(¯ x(a)). It follows that
for each z > 0, hp,zi > 0. Now from Assumption 3.1, for each a ∈ Ω, e(a) > 0, hence
inf{hp,zi : z ∈ `
p
+} = 0 < hp,e(a)i.

Appendix A. Finitely many consumers
We suppose in this section that the economy is ﬁnite in the sense that the set of consumers
(Ω,A,µ) is (I,2I,σ) where I is a ﬁnite set, 2I is the σ-algebra of all subsets of I and σ is the
counting measure.
A.1. The general case. If E is strong-uniformly proper then we denote by Γ the norm-open
convex cone deﬁned by Γ = {x ∈ `p : hα,x+i > hβ,x−i}.
Theorem A.1. Let E be a ﬁnite economy satisfying Assumptions 3.1–3.4. If E is strong-uniformly
proper then there exists a pair (x,p) consisting of a feasible allocation x and a non-zero price p
such that
(1) for each i ∈ I, hp,xii = hp,eii, and z ∈ Pi(xi) implies hp,zi > hp,xii;
(2) hp,ωi = 1 and hp,Γi > 0.
Proof. Since order intervals [0,x] = {y ∈ `p: 0 6 y 6 x} are w-compact, following Florenzano [8],
there exists a feasible allocation x = (xi)i such that7




Lemma A.2. G(x) ∩ −Γ = ∅.
Proof. To see this,8 assume by way of contradiction that G(x) ∩ −Γ 6= ∅. Then there exist γ ∈ Γ,
(λi)i with λi > 0,
P
i λi = 1 and (zi)i with zi ∈ Pi(xi) such that
X
i




Suppose ﬁrst that γ > 0. For each i ∈ I, we set yi := zi + γ. Then yi i zi for each i since







and we have thus got a contradiction.
Thus suppose that γ− 6= 0. We must have γ− 6
P
i λizi, so by the Riesz decomposition theorem
there exist elements ui > 0 such that ui 6 zi and
P













7In fact x is an Edgeworth equilibrium of E.
8The argument given in the sequel to establish this lemma is taken from Zame [23] and Podczeck [20].12 A. ARAUJO, V. F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND P. K. MONTEIRO
with stirct inequality if ui 6= 0. Hence because ui 6 zi and vi > 0, we have zi − ui + vi i zi
for each i (in fact, zi − ui + vi i zi in case ui 6= 0), and therefore by transitivity of preference
relations, zi − ui + vi i xi. Also
X
i
λi(zi − ui + vi) =
X
i









again we get a contradiction. 
Following Lemma A.2, since Γ is s-open, it follows from the separation theorem that there exists
some non-zero linear functional p ∈ `q with hp,gi > −hp,γi for each g ∈ G(x) and γ ∈ Γ. It is
now routine to prove that (x,p) satisﬁes properties (1) and (2) of Theorem A.1. 
A.2. The separable case. We recall that a utility function u : `
p
+ → R is called separable if there







Theorem A.3. Let E be a ﬁnite economy satisfying Assumptions 3.1–3.4. If E is separably proper
then there exists a pair (x,p) consisting of a feasible allocation x and a non-zero price p such that
(1) for each i ∈ I, hp,xii = hp,eii, and z ∈ Pi(xi) implies hp,zi > hp,xii;
(2) hp,ωi = 1 and kpkq 6 (1/αkωk)kβkq.
The proof of Theorem A.3 is mostly inspired by the proof of Theorem 3 in Araujo–Monteiro [3].
Proof. We prove Theorem A.3 in two steps. For the ﬁrst step, we suppose that the economy
satisﬁes an additional assumption on the initial endowments.
Step 1: Strictly positive initial endowments. Suppose that for each i, ei is strictly positive.
Let Eω be the vector space of all z ∈ `p such that there exists r > 0 satisfying −rω 6 z 6 rω.
From Lemma 1 in Araujo–Monteiro [3], there exists a pair (x,p) consisting of a feasible allocation9
x and a non-zero linear functional p : Eω → R such that p is positive, i.e. hp,zi > 0 for each
z ∈ Eω
+; hp,ωi = 1 and such that
∀i ∈ I, hp,xii = hp,eii and z ∈ Pi(xi) ∩ Eω ⇒ hp,zi > hp,eii.
Now there exists i with hp,eii > 0, and since ui is strictly monotone, p is strictly positive, i.e.
hp,zi > 0 for each 0 6= z ∈ Eω
+. In particular hp,eii > 0 for each i ∈ I. By the concave alternative
(see Lemma 5 in [3]), for each i there exists λi > 0 such that
∀z ∈ Eω
+, ui(z) − ui(xi) 6 λi hp,z − xii. (A.1)
For z ∈ `
p
+ we deﬁne S(z) = {h ∈ `p: ∃t > 0, z + th > 0} and I(z) = S(z) ∩ −S(z). Using (A.1)
like in [3], we have
∀h ∈ I(xi) ∩ Eω






9Note that if x is a feasible allocation then xi ∈ Eω.EQUILIBRIA IN SECURITY MARKETS WITH A CONTINUUM OF AGENTS 13
Since ei is striclty positive for each i, we have that b := inf{ei: i ∈ I} is strictly positive. Hence
Eb is norm-dense in `p. From this we conclude that if p is norm-continuous on Eb then we can
extend it to a linear functional still noted p in `q, such that (x,p) satisﬁes
∀i ∈ I, hp,xii = hp,eii and z ∈ Pi(xi) ⇒ hp,zi > hp,eii.
So let us prove that p is norm-continuous on Eb.
We deﬁne for each n, In := {i ∈ I : xi,n > ei,n} and for each i we deﬁne Ni = {n ∈ N : i =
minIn}. Since x is a feasible allocation, we have In 6= ∅ for every n and (Ni)i is a partition of N.






|hn| if n ∈ Ni
0 if n 6∈ Ni.

































i(z)·h = limr→0(1/r)(ui(z +rh)−ui(z)) for each z ∈ `
p
+ and each h ∈ S(z). It follows
from (A.1) and separable properness that
0 < αkωk < u0












βn|hn| 6 (1/αkωk)kβkq khkp .
From separable properness we have that kβkq < +∞. This proves the norm-continuity of p on Eb.
Step 2: Positive initial endowments. Let E be a separably proper ﬁnite economy satisfying
Assumptions 3.1–3.4. Let v be a strictly positive vector of `p and consider En the economy
deﬁned by E = (I,`p,X,,en) where en
i := ei + (1/n)v. Since v
−
i (en
i ) 6 v
−
i (ei), the economy
En is separably proper and satisﬁes Asssumptions 3.1–3.4. Applying Step1, there exists a pair
(xn,pn) consisting of a feasible allocation xn and a non-zero price pn such that for each i ∈ I,
hp,xn
i i = hp,en
i i, z ∈ Pi(xn
i ) implies hpn,zi > hpn,xn
i i, hpn,ωni = 1 and kpnkq 6 (1/αkωn
k)kβkq.
Since the sequence (ωn
k)n is norm-convergent to ωk, it follows that the sequence (pn)n is norm-
bounded, and passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can suppose that the sequence (pn)n is
w∗-convergent to a price p ∈ `q with kpkq 6 (1/αkωk)kβkq. Moreover, since hpn,ωni = 1 it follows
that hp,ωi = 1.
For each i, xn
i belongs to the interval [0,ω + v], in particular, passing to a subsequence if
necessary, we can suppose that (xn






we have that x is a feasible allocation for the economy E. It is now routine to prove that for each
i ∈ I, hp,xii = hp,eii, and z ∈ Pi(xi) implies hp,zi > hp,xii. 
10Note that v−
i,n is a decreasing function.14 A. ARAUJO, V. F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND P. K. MONTEIRO
Appendix B. Measurable correspondences
We consider (Ω,A,µ) a ﬁnite complete measure space and (D,d) a separable metric space.
We recall that a function f : Ω → D is measurable if for each open set G ⊂ D, f−1(G) ∈ A
where f−1(G) := {a ∈ Ω : f(a) ∈ G}. A correspondence F : Ω  D is graph measurable if
GF := {(a,x) ∈ Ω × D : x ∈ F(a)} ∈ A ⊗ B(D), where B(D) is the σ-algebra of Borelian subsets
of D.
B.1. Measurable selections. Following Aumann [5], graph measurable correspondences have
measurable selections.
Theorem B.1. Consider F a graph measurable correspondence from Ω into D with non-empty
values. If (D,d) is complete then there exists a sequence (zn)n of measurable selections of F, such
that for each a ∈ Ω, (zn(a))n is d-dense in F(a).
B.2. Discretization of measurable correspondences.
Deﬁnition B.2. A partition σ = (Ai)i∈I of Ω is a measurable partition if for each i ∈ I, the set
Ai is non-empty and belongs to A. A ﬁnite subset Aσ of Ω is subordinated to the partition σ if
there exists a family (ai)i∈I ∈
Q
i∈I Ai such that Aσ = {ai : i ∈ I}.
Given a couple (σ,Aσ) where σ = (Ai)i∈I is a measurable partition of Ω, and Aσ = {ai : i ∈ I}
is a ﬁnite set subordinated to σ, we consider φ(σ,Aσ) the application which maps each measurable





where χAi is the characteristic11 function associated to Ai.
Deﬁnition B.3. A function s : Ω → D is called a simple function subordinated to f if there exists
a couple (σ,Aσ) where σ is a measurable partition of Ω, and Aσ is a ﬁnite set subordinated to σ,
such that s = φ(σ,Aσ)(f).
Given a couple (σ,Aσ) where σ = (Ai)i∈I is a measurable partition of Ω, and Aσ = {ai : i ∈ I}
is a ﬁnite set subordinated to σ, we consider ψ(σ,Aσ), the application which maps each measurable





Deﬁnition B.4. A correspondence S : Ω → D is called a simple correspondence subordinated to a
correspondence F if there exists a couple (σ,Aσ) where σ is a measurable partition of Ω, and Aσ
is a ﬁnite set subordinated to σ, such that S = ψ(σ,Aσ)(F).
Remark B.5. If f is a function from Ω to D, let {f} be the correspondence from Ω into D, deﬁned
for each a ∈ Ω by {f}(a) := {f(a)}. We check that
ψ(σ,Aσ)(F) = {φ(σ,Aσ)(f)}.
11That is, for each a ∈ Ω, χAi(a) = 1 if a ∈ Ai and χAi(a) = 0 elsewhere.EQUILIBRIA IN SECURITY MARKETS WITH A CONTINUUM OF AGENTS 15
The space of all non-empty subsets of D is noted P∗(D). We let τWd be the Wisjman topology
on P∗(D), that is the weak topology on P∗(D) generated by the family of distance functions
(d(x,.))x∈D.
Hereafter we assert that for a countable set of graph measurable correspondences, there exists a
sequence of measurable partitions approximating each correspondence. The proof of the following
theorem is given in Martins-da-Rocha [13].
Theorem B.6. Let F be a countable set of graph measurable correspondences with non-empty
values from Ω into D and let G be a ﬁnite set of integrable functions from Ω into R. There exists a
sequence (σn)n of ﬁner and ﬁner measurable partitions σn = (An
i )i∈In of Ω, satisfying the following
properties.
(a) Let (An)n be a sequence of ﬁnite sets An subordinated to the measurable partition σn and
let F ∈ F. For each n ∈ N, we deﬁne the simple correspondence Fn := ψ(σn,An)(F)
subordinated to F. Then for each a ∈ Ω, F(a) is the Wijsman limit of the sequence
(Fn(a))n, i.e.,
∀a ∈ Ω, ∀x ∈ D, lim
n
d(x,Fn(a)) = d(x,F(a)).
(b) There exists a sequence (An)n of ﬁnite sets An subordinated to the measurable partition
σn, such that for each n, if we let fn := φ(σn,An)(f) be the simple function subordinated
to each f ∈ G, then









|fn(a) − f(a)|dµ(a) = 0.
Remark B.7. The property (a) implies in particular that, if (xn)n is a sequence of D, d-converging
to x ∈ D, then
∀a ∈ Ω, lim
n d(xn,Fn(a)) = d(x,F(a)).
It follows that if F is non-empty closed valued, then property (a) implies that
∀a ∈ Ω, lsnFn(a) ⊂ F(a).
Appendix C. Fatou’s Lemma
The proof of the following theorem is given in Cornet–Martins-da-Rocha [6].
Theorem C.1. Let (Ω,A,µ) be a ﬁnite positive complete measure space. Let (fn)n be a sequence
of Bochner integrable mappings from Ω to `
p





kfn(a)kp dµ(a) < +∞.
Suppose that w-limn
R
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